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Abstract This article aims to open a new line of debate about religion in public schools
by focusing on religious ideals. The article begins with an elucidation of the concept
‘religious ideals’ and an explanation of the notion of reasonable pluralism, in order to be
able to explore the dangers and positive contributions of religious ideals and their pursuit
on a liberal democratic society. We draw our examples of religious ideals from Christianity
and Islam, because these religions have most adherents in Western liberal democracies that
are the focus of this article. The fifth and most important section ‘‘Reasonable pluralism
and the inclusion of religious ideals in public secondary schools’’ provides three arguments
for our claim that public schools should include religious ideals, namely that they are
important to religious people, that they are conducive for the development of pupils into
citizens of a liberal democracy, and that the flourishing of pupils as adults is advanced by
encountering religious ideals. We also offer a more practical reason: religious ideals can
more easily be included within public education than religious dogmas and rules.
Keywords Reasonable pluralism  Religious ideals  Public schools 
Political liberalism  Liberal  Democracy
Introduction
Public or state schools in some Western liberal democratic societies are notoriously silent
on the subject of religion. Operating on a certain reading of the constitutional separation of
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church and state, schools are expected to be ‘neutral’1 concerning conceptions of the good
life. Hence, the argument runs, the best way of guaranteeing that the state does not
influence its young citizens towards a particular religious view of things is to have no
religion in public schools at all. Although this line of argument is logically consistent, we
will defend the opposite position: religion should be an aspect of the education of pupils in
public schools. The arguments for this claim do not involve the suggestion that schools
should include religions uncritically or that every aspect of every religion prevalent in
society should be covered in its curriculum. Neither will we defend the view that schools
should aim to strengthen religious adherence amongst their pupils. Our claim is that there
is at least one aspect of religions that public schools should address, namely the ideals that
are fostered within religious traditions and which believers adhere to and pursue. We will
show that if public schools offer pupils the opportunity to learn from a diversity of
religious ideals they contribute to one of the important aims of education in liberal
democracies, i.e. that pupils become reasonable citizens,2 and that they are able to do so
without advocating a particular conception of the good life.
Yet we knowingly enter a crowded field of inquiry, for there is a long-standing dis-
cussion about religion in schools, separate schools, state-funding of separate schools in
both Europe3 and North America.4 Contributors to the debates come from different aca-
demic backgrounds—philosophy of education, practical theology or political philosophy—
and address different topics. Some have questioned whether religious education simpliciter
or religious schools can be justified (see McLaughlin 1984, 1985; Callan 1985; Dwyer
1998; De Ruyter and Miedema 2000; Hand 2004). Others have addressed the question of
whether or not religious education and civic education are compatible (see Gutmann 1995;
Macedo 1995), and, if they are, what sort of virtues religious schools promote (see Callan
1997; Spinner-Halev 2000; Gardner et al. 2002; Feinberg 2006; Merry 2007). Still other
debates include the distinctiveness of separate schools (see Bryk et al. 1993; McLaughlin
1996; Conroy 1999) and whether or not religious views ought to be given ‘equal time’ in
the classroom, etc. (see Nord 1995; Pennock 2007). We will set these and many other
debates aside in order to concentrate on religious ideals in public schools.
We have several reasons for defending our focus on religious ideals. First, for persons of
faith, religious ideals are one of the most important sources of meaning and therefore
constitute an important part of their identity that schools in multicultural societies are
1 Although public schools are neutral towards religions, they are not neutral per se, nor should they be. As
instruments of the state, public schools have an important function to play in promoting specific kinds of
civic virtue.
2 We shall have more to say about reasonableness below, but briefly by reasonable we mean that persons are
prepared to respectfully listen to and interpret what others have to say, as well as propose fair terms of
cooperation with others with whom one may not agree.
3 For an overview of ideas about or practices in religious education in Europe see for instance Leicester
et al. 2000 or Jackson et al. 2007.
4 It should be noted, however, that the debate among educators and philosophers of education in North
America has focused primarily on fundamentalist or orthodox religious communities and families. This is
understandable, because these believers tend to draw most public attention hrough court cases (the Yoder
case or the Mozert case) and because they tend to be opposed to mainstream liberal views and scientific
theories. There is, however, a disadvantage to this focus on fundamentalist and orthodox communities.
Fundamentalists and orthodox believers represent only one group within the enormous diversity of religious
persons, and quite a distinct one. This means that the discussion about inclusion of religion in schools runs
the risk of being too narrow in focus. In Europe, this focus is less prevalent, although it is interesting to note
that in debates about schools in France, a country whose public school system is also strictly secular,
conservatives—Muslims in this case—form the center of attention.
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called upon to recognize (see Salili and Hoosain 2006). Second, as we will argue, being a
citizen in a liberal democratic society requires particular dispositions as well as knowledge
and understanding. Children are more likely to develop into reasonable liberal democratic
citizens when they possess an understanding of the ideals that motivate the actions of other
citizens. In other words, we believe it is less important that children know about the
practices and central dogmas of the main religions in their society, than that they under-
stand the ultimate motivations of other people, i.e. the ideals to which fellow citizens
aspire. Third, we will argue that the possibility that children will flourish as adults is
advanced by offering them a variety of ideals to examine and consider (see also Levinson
and Levinson 2007; De Ruyter 2007). Religious ideals provide a valuable source of
alternative views on what contributes to a flourishing life.5
Finally, there is a practical reason, which may nevertheless be a convincing argument
concerning why public schools should include religious ideals in their curriculum. It seems
clear to us that religious ideals can more easily be included within public education than
religious dogmas and rules. Ideals, as we will explain, are typically abstract in character
and therefore are open to personal interpretations of those who subscribe to the ideal—
although we will show that ideals may lose this character, too. The openness of ideals has
two important advantages. First, it gives them the potential to function as bridges between
persons and their community and those who have attachments to different communities.
Second, while the value of ideals can be discussed (see for instance Noddings 1993) or
their importance can be scrutinized, they do not lend themselves to an examination of the
epistemological basis or truth claims of religious beliefs in public schools as some propose
(see Rosenblith 2008; Rosenblith and Priestman 2004). In our view, such discussions
certainly have their place, but a number of conceptual and logistical obstacles in schools
stand in the way of this happening.6 Therefore, our more modest claim is this: to become
good citizens, pupils must understand what inspires and motivates other people. Moreover
it is important that they are offered the opportunity to discover whether or not there is a
possible value in religious ideals for them too – which, as we will explain, does not mean
that they ought to become religious persons themselves.
We circumscribe our discussion in at least three ways. First, the relevant contexts in this
article are Western liberal democracies. Our arguments will primarily pertain to North
America because the place of religion in public schools is more openly contested there.
While European religious piety (at least among Christians) has been in decline since the
1960s, a large percentage of the North American population, particularly in the United
States, continues to be religiously devout. Consequently, appeals for including religious
ideals in public schools have particular resonance. However, our arguments are not limited
to North America; indeed, they also broadly pertain to the European context, because while
religious education is widely on offer—indeed, outside of secular France, some religious
5 Briefly, people are able to lead a flourishing life if they give personal meaning to the objective goods that
are good for all human beings, for instance health, relations, creative and intellectual development, and if the
life that follows from this is satisfying to them. We will return to this in the section ‘‘Reasonable pluralism
and the inclusion of religious ideals in public secondary schools’’.
6 Proponents of epistemic analysis will no doubt object to this, claiming that we are exempting religious
truth claims from rational analysis and engaging in some kind of multicultural moral relativism. Yet we
would argue that conceptually religious truth claims by their very nature are non-rational and therefore are
not amenable to rational analysis. Further, the difficulties both with respect to adequate (and unbiased)
teacher training and parental objections to epistemological analysis of their faith claims in classrooms surely
must give us pause.
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instruction is mandated7 by the state—its focus most of the time is decidedly Christian in
character, thus excluding most non-Christian religious ideals. In fact, the virtual absence of
non-Christian religious instruction in most non-religious schools in Europe has precipitated
repeated calls for separate religious schools in order to address what parents claim are the
spiritual needs of pupils. Thus our argument for the inclusion of religious ideals in public
education implies the inclusion of Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, etc. ideals. Second,
while the arguments we develop in this article apply to all schools, our focus is on public or
state schools. Denominational schools can reasonably be expected to offer a variety of
religious ideals too, but because their position with regard to religion(s) is profoundly
different from public schools we will not pursue that line of defense here. Third, our
arguments apply to high schools or secondary schools, because they assume particular
cognitive capacities that children at primary school age do not normally possess.
Finally, it is necessary that we are selective in our examples of specific religions. In
Western liberal democratic societies the two religions with the most adherents are
Christianity and Islam. To be sure, Christianity has enjoyed an historically privileged
position in Western society, and other important differences are salient (e.g., Muslims do
not comprise a socioeconomic underclass in North America). However, in our age of so-
called ‘global terror’, Muslims in both North America and Europe receive a lot of public
attention. Particularly on continental Europe, the fear of so-called Islamization of society
has led to a significant increase of—primarily negative—attention in the media and pol-
itics. Therefore, with regard to the position of religion in the public domain and public
schools, our examples in this article are drawn from these religions and our arguments also
are illustrated by reference to these two religions.
Before we can begin with addressing the central question, we will first elucidate the
meaning of ‘religious ideals’. In the sections ‘‘Religious ideals in the public domain’’ and
‘‘Reasonable pluralism and religious ideals’’, we will then address the more general
question of whether or not religious ideals have a role to play in the public domain and how
this role may be evaluated. In the section ‘‘Reasonable pluralism and the inclusion of
religious ideals in public secondary schools’’ we will provide arguments for including
religious ideals in the curriculum of public schools and we end with a concise conclusion.
Religious Ideals
Religious ideals can be defined as ideals that acquire meaning due to a belief in something
transcendent or a divine being (De Ruyter 2006). This means that only ideals that are
related to a religious conception of the good are called religious ideals and that they are
exclusive to those who adhere to such a conception.8 Thus, we reserve the term religious
ideals for those with beliefs in something transcendent and only for those ideals that are
related to their beliefs. This gives rise to two kinds of religious ideals. The first type may be
called religious ideals in the strict sense and consists of ideals that are constituted by a
7 Of course, there are usually opt out provisions in place, and in some countries ethical instruction of a non-
specific sort may be substituted for religious education.
8 ‘Religious ideals’ is the generic name of a category consisting of a wide range of specific religious types
of ideals, for instance Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Bahai’ ideals. And it might be argued that
these labels are still too general. For instance, Christianity (like many other religions) is a highly diversified
religion, which may even make it impossible to speak about ‘Christian ideals’. Rather, one may wish to use
terms like Roman Catholic ideals, Eastern Orthodox ideals, Wesleyan ideals, Reformed ideals, etc, though
of course one will find various subsets within each of these traditions as well.
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belief in a transcendent being. These ideals are oriented towards the divine or are char-
acteristic of one’s relation to the divine. Such ideals are only pursued by people who
believe in something transcendent or a transcendent being; the ideals have no meaning
beyond this faith. For instance, the ideal of a devout Christian may be to live up to the
commandments of God. The second type of religious ideals refers to religious ideals in the
broad sense. These ideals belong to other domains of life, i.e. the moral, social, economic,
political or aesthetic domain, but these ideals get a specific religious meaning through the
belief in a divine being. For instance, the aspiration of being a good Christian or a good
Muslim is translated into ideals regarding the way in which society is best organized, the
economy is ideally run, etc. The relationship between the religious and other domains is
normally an iterative one, i.e. the way in which people conceptualize their ideals is based
on a mutual influence. We do not wish to suggest that the religious domain is necessarily
foundational for the other kinds of ideals, although for some groups, most particularly
fundamentalist believers, this will be the case.
Religious ideals are a type of ideals and therefore we also have to describe the concept
of ‘ideals’. We define ‘ideals’ as those values that people believe to be excellent or perfect,
to which they attach high importance, and that have not been realized as yet (De Ruyter
2003, 2007). Put differently, ideals are imaginations or visions of situations or personal
characteristics that the person who has the ideal believes to be excellent or perfect and to
which she attaches high value. The images tend to be open to diverse interpretations, for
they refer to visions of traits of character and situations that are not precisely defined and
therefore persons find it necessary to give their own interpretation to the ideal. We can
illustrate this by examining a small section of the diversity of conceptions of religious
ideals found in Christianity. Christians are called upon by Jesus in his Sermon on the
Mount to be as perfect as God is (Matthew 5: 48), which includes relating to one’s enemies
with charitable love (agape) and forgiving the offending other as much as ‘‘seventy times
seven.’’ However, the characteristics that are ascribed to God in the Bible are highly
diverse, for instance that He is all-knowing, righteous, jealous, immutable, forgiving,
vengeful and merciful. Similarly, what characterises heaven and the ways in which
Christians pursue the situation they call heaven, may also be very different. Further, it is
also clear that Christians have different and even conflicting views on what constitutes an
ideal society or ideally run economy, for Christians can be found on the (far) left and (far)
right of the political spectrum. And finally, Christ’s commandment to make disciples of all
nations (Matthew 28:19) has been interpreted in a variety of ways, from Christopher
Columbus’ violent and exploitative colonisation and Christianization of indigenous peo-
ples, to the arguably selfless work of Mother Theresa in the slums of Calcutta.9
But before we go any further, we will briefly elucidate the distinction between religious
dogmas and rules which we referred to in the introduction. We will mention three
important differences. First, religious ideals are open to a personal interpretation by
believers, while dogmas and particularly rules are laid down in relatively precise terms that
the believers are expected to adopt. Phrased in terms of Nicholas Rescher (1987, p. 122):
ideals are the spirit of the law, while rules and regulations are the letter of the law. Of
course, this description is crude and should be nuanced, but it is helpful for a good
understanding of what religious ideals are. The nuance with regard to ideals is for instance
that there are boundaries to the personal interpretation one may give to religious ideals,
because they also have a communal character: religious ideals arise out of a shared social
9 Although there will be those who would argue that she was not actually doing selfless work, but was
merely working out her own salvation.
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practice within a community of believers. Not every personal interpretation will be
recognised as a version of the communal religious ideal. For instance, most Christians
would not recognise a hedonistic world in which everyone aspires to have as much fun as
possible as they would an eschatological ideal of heaven on earth. On the other hand,
dogmas and rules are not as unalterable as they may seem. Throughout history, religious
communities have altered their rules and requirements and dogmas have evolved over
time. Furthermore, each differs in importance; while disregarding a more peripheral rule is
normally not a reason for exclusion, breaching central dogmas may indicate that a person
no longer perceives himself to be a member of the religious community. However, this is
possible precisely because dogmas and rules operate rather differently, and the importance
ascribed to each varies.
Second, ideals belong to the aspirational domain, while dogmas and rules belong to the
domain of duties.10 Rules and dogmas describe what people must do or believe if they are
to meaningfully adhere to a particular faith. For instance, ordinarily Muslims are required
to follow the five pillars of Islam, i.e. to fulfil the five duties—among which are daily
prayer, giving alms, fasting during the Ramadan—if they want to be considered good
Muslims; Christians are expected to believe that Jesus is the son of God. Religious ideals,
on the other hand are aspirations that aim for an optimum outcome. Believers cannot be
obligated to pursue religious ideals, because ideals reach beyond what may be required of
people; they refer to excellences to which people aspire, not to expectations people have to
pursue.
Finally people are intrinsically motivated to pursue an ideal. While they can follow rules
for extrinsic reasons, for instance because they want to belong to a religious community or
participate in its rituals, they pursue an ideal because they are convinced of the excellent
qualities to which the ideal refers. Therefore, religious ideals, and not dogmas, will often
tell us more far more about a person.
The combination of the high importance attached to the ideal and the supremacy of the
value the ideal refers to motivates individuals to pursue their ideals. This makes ideals a
powerful source of meaning and action. However, ideals—including the ways in which
they are pursued—can be good or evil, as we will argue in the next sections.
Religious Ideals in the Public Domain
Religious ideals in the broad sense comprise religious conceptions of political and moral
ideals, which per implication means that religious views have a bearing on discussions in
the public and political domain. A lot has been written about religion in the public and
political domain and therefore we will only briefly describe three possible evaluations of
religiously influenced moral and political ideals in the public and political domain within
Western liberal democracies.
The first evaluation of reference to religious ideals in the public domain is a negative
one: religious ideals undermine social cohesion and, therefore, are disruptive to political
stability. Religious ideals can be understood as having two characteristics that may more
easily give people the justification to impose their ideals on everyone: (1) they are sanc-
tioned by an unquestioned authority and (2) they are believed to be in the best interests of
all—whether in this life or in the afterlife. Because some religious groups operate on the
10 Here we follow Fuller (1969), who makes the distinction between the morality of duty and the morality
of aspirations.
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force of these convictions in their attempts to convert others, including the use of political
power to impose those convictions, it is argued that allowing reference to religious ideals
in the public and particularly the political domain undermines the existence of a peaceful
pluralistic society. This will be difficult to deny when religious ideals require that all
humans need to be converted by whatever means necessary. In these instances, ideals may
indeed prove to be highly dangerous.
History has given us myriad examples as evidence that religious ideals impel some
people to become religious extremists and recent examples are not hard to come by either;
presently most western countries have installed special (intelligence) organizations to
combat the threat of religiously-inspired terrorism. Even when religious ideals do not
necessarily lead to extremism, they can encourage oppression of those who hold alternative
views. This is particularly the case when ideals become concrete blueprints that are thought
to be realizable. Emmet (1994) has eloquently described the difference between two
conceptions of ideals. Regulative ideals do not describe a practice or society in precise
detail like blueprints, but offer a standard for a practice. Furthermore, while regulative
ideals are perceived to be unrealizable, blueprints are presented as an achievable states of
affairs. Finally, regulative ideals orient a practice, whereas blueprints prescribe what
should be thought and done (1994, p. 17). When religious ideals of an ideal society become
utopian blueprints, religious adherents may try to realize the utopia by whatever means
available to them; if the ideal society can be realized, the end may well justify all means.
However, the second evaluation is that religiously inspired ideals can have a positive
influence on society, because they offer an alternative voice that can make a constructive
contribution to discussions of social or political import. In addition to being self-regarding,
many religious ideals are other-regarding (as well as Other-regarding). This ethical
dimension of religious ideals can have a positive influence on the ways in which societies
function. In some cases, the voice of religion may even buttress the most reasonable
arguments on offer concerning human rights and dignity, which, for example, occurred
during twentieth-century freedom struggles in India and the United States. Yet one does
not have to think of moral paragons such as Mahatma Ghandi or Martin Luther King Jr.;
there are also other, less renowned, religious persons and groups that feed and shelter
homeless people, offer drug counseling, employment assistance, etc.
Both of these evaluations can be accused of one-sidedness or of being simplistic, for it is
obvious that the positions can defeat one another by the examples and arguments they each
provide. Yet a third evaluation can be positioned in the middle. This evaluation does not
deny the importance of religious ideals for people, but merely states that they cannot be a
basis for public or political law. An example of this position is Rawls’ idea of the over-
lapping consensus. According to Rawls (1987, 1989, 1993) it is unreasonable to impose a
comprehensive doctrine like religion on all citizens of a society. Rather, the basic structure
of a society should be founded on ‘‘fundamental ideas we seem to share through the public
political culture’’ (1993, p. 150). Reasonable principles are (1) those which are accessible
to reasonable persons and which facilitate willing consent, and (2) those which are con-
sistent with fair terms of cooperation and free and equal citizenship. Rawls ascribes two
qualities to a reasonable person, namely that they are ‘‘ready to propose principles and
standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance
that others will likewise do so’’ and ‘‘that they are ready to discuss the fair terms others
propose’’ (1993, p. 49). These two qualities are also articulated as two moral powers: a
capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good.
As an ideal, reasonable pluralism describes a society, comprised of many conceptions of
the good, in which reasonable persons, as citizens, willingly support a political conception
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of justice that is not grounded in comprehensive truth claims but by principles they may
endorse in light of their common human reason. So a well-crafted political conception of
justice that governs the basic structure of society will function independently of compre-
hensive doctrines. Of course this does not mean that a political conception of justice cannot
fit into or be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Thus, significantly,
one’s religious conviction is not excluded from the public domain in the sense that it may
be one of many good reasons for supporting the non-comprehensive political conception of
justice. As Rawls suggests, ‘‘It is left to citizens individually to decide for themselves in
what way their shared political conception is related to their wider and more compre-
hensive views’’ (1989, p. 249).
The middle position is not neutral vis-a`-vis all religious ideals, for then it would be a
version of the second (positive) evaluation. It does place limits on the acceptability of
positions and the way in which they are pursued (see for instance Macedo 2000; De Jong
and Snik 2002). For instance, it requires that principles of toleration and recognition as
well as the harm principle necessarily apply. That is, individuals and the communities to
which they belong may not act upon their ideals in ways that harm others (physically or
psychologically), including fellow group members. Further, internal restrictions must be
challenged that unduly limit the exercise of free will or which impose unfair restrictions on
exiting a community (Spiecker et al. 2006). Determining what constitutes ‘unfair’ will
invariably require examining specific cases but we can outline minimal prerequisites such
as that children especially require the resources—beginning, importantly, with an educa-
tion—to develop their capacity for making deliberative judgments and acting upon those
judgments without fear of reprisal, even (or, perhaps especially) in cases of apostasy.
Developing such capacities necessarily excludes practices like indoctrination or brain-
washing that aim to establish precisely the opposite effect (see Merry 2005). Thus, some
ideals will more comfortably ‘fit’ within reasonable pluralism’s demands, while others will
ostensibly be squeezed out, or, at least be made to feel less welcome.
Even though the principles of reasonable pluralism cannot include all ideals of all
citizens, we still maintain that the principles of reasonable pluralism serve a pluralistic
society in the best way. Pluralism in western societies is a fact, which can be lamented or
applauded, but it is the situation in which people in Western societies live. The best type of
organization of pluralistic societies is one that allows all people to flourish by giving
meaning to their lives on the basis of the ideals they value. Yet this is an arrangement that
is impossible to realize, because the ideals of some may inhibit the pursuit of ideals of
other citizens, and ideals should therefore be interpreted as a regulative ideal. Thus, a
society should be organized in such a way that citizens can aspire to the regulative ideal in
conjunction with giving meaning to their own lives on the basis of their private ideals. We
suggest that reasonable pluralism is the best way of doing so, because well-crafted public
policies will not be based on a particular conception of the good life that coerces citizens
to comply without their consent. Moreover, reasonable pluralism encourages citizens to
reflect upon the best way in which a pluralistic society can include the diversity of ideals.
In other words, reasonable pluralism offers the best opportunity for citizens to evaluate
policies and practices in the public domain by means of the regulative ideal that everyone
will be able to flourish.
Nevertheless, it might be argued that reasonable pluralism is unjust, because it is
intolerant towards people who adhere to (religious) ideals that do not cohere with rea-
sonableness. Moreover, education congenial to reasonable pluralism, which requires that
children learn that they need to complement their religious ideals with reasonableness in
the public domain, may have the consequence of placing some in conflict with their
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religious ideals. Consider how many deeply religious persons feel profoundly uncom-
fortable with the manner in which pluralism appears to govern public life. Seemingly
endless choices and opportunities provide little comfort to those whose ultimate religious
ideals decisively trump other ideals. Indeed, reasonable pluralism is believed by some
(Holmes 1995; Tarazi 1987; Yousif 2000) to be a type of moral relativism that has an
intentionally eroding effect on their cultural or religious ideals.11 Such beliefs may induce
some to withdraw from the public sphere, or others to banish them from democratic
conversations. Yet this would be an unfortunate outcome, as Strike (2007, p. 707) reminds
us:
[D]emocratic conversations that seek common ground cannot begin by excluding a
whole genre of widely held views from serious discussion. Moreover, the attempt to
exclude has tended to cause the expression of such views to go underground where
they gain strength, go unrebutted and emerge in aggressive and theocratic forms. It is
both more principled and strategically wiser to invite advocates of such views to the
conversational table.
It is true that the principles of reasonableness are not neutral against every position, but
this does not necessarily make them unjust. This would only be the case if they conflict
with pursuing the regulative ideal of a society in which everyone can flourish. Since the
opposite is true, sufficient reasons exist for defending reasonable pluralism as the best
organizing principle of a pluralistic society. Thus, reasonable pluralism is the background
against which we aim to defend the position that religious ideals be included in the
curriculum of schools. The three evaluations offered above have shown that it is necessary
to make a distinction between two aspects of religious ideals: the ideals themselves can be
evaluated with regard to their compatibility with the ideals of a liberal democracy and the
way in which they are pursued can be scrutinized. Before we address this topic, we first
want to give a more precise account of the ways in which religious ideals and the ideals of
reasonable pluralism may be compatible or incompatible.
Reasonable Pluralism and Religious Ideals
The former section has not settled the matter of precisely how religious ideals can best be
voiced within the public sphere, or, for that matter, whether all religious ideals are com-
patible with reasonable pluralism. We suggest that there are three possible evaluations,
both with regard to the ideals as well as their pursuit: they can be complementary to,
neutral, and opposite to the ideals of a liberal democracy.
Some religious ideals are complimentary to the purposes of the liberal state. Indeed, far
from being inimical to the interests of the public, some religious ideals may be perfectly
compatible with liberal notions of citizenship such as equality of persons, individual
autonomy and freedom of expression. Though sometimes expressed differently religious
ideals may nevertheless extend the language of reasonable pluralism in useful ways. A
powerful example of such an ideal is ‘all people are equal in the eyes of God’ that
Christians profess, which complements the liberal right to non-discrimination. Another one
would be ‘to love your neighbor as yourself’, which is consistent with the liberal notion of
11 Importantly, when this perception is aggravated by unfavourable economic circumstances and social
exclusion, conditions may be ripe for strengthening less tolerant religious ideals that militate against those
prized by liberal democratic states.
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reciprocity. Most Christian ideal characteristics of a person are also complementary to
those valued in liberal democracies. We have already mentioned ideals like being righteous
or just, humble, merciful and charitable. Each may contribute to a flourishing liberal
democracy. That these ideals are not unique to Christianity may be offered as a further
illustration that religious ideals can be compatible not only with other religious ideals but
also to the presumed secular ideals of the liberal democracy and reasonable pluralism.
The same may be said of Islam. For the majority of Muslims in the West, Islamic ideals
and practices normally do not conflict with the ideals of reasonable pluralism. Similar to
our Christian example, most Islamic and liberal ideals have a complementary relationship,
and Muslims normally support the political institutions that help to make their life a rather
good one (see Malik 2001, 2004; March 2006). The pursuit of religious ideals that are
complementary can also be conducive to a flourishing liberal democracy. If religious ideals
are voiced reasonably they can keep alive the critical debate amongst citizens about what
constitutes an ideal liberal democracy and in which ways liberal societies fall short. This
certainly happens when Muslims challenge various types of discrimination, or push for
positive freedoms, including the right to bury their dead or slaughter animals according to
Islamic custom, or work to advance legislation in order to receive equal treatment in
establishing Islamic schools. To be sure, Muslims who exercise their political will in this
way are voicing an alternative to the prevailing practices that favour certain (normally
Christian or secular) institutions; however, they are doing so in a manner that is consistent
with deliberative democratic ideals and the requirements of reasonable pluralism. Hence,
when religious ideals enter the political arena in this way, there is potentially real fruit to
be borne.
Religious ideals that are politically neutral comprise only a small group. They primarily
consist of religious ideals in the strict sense, i.e. ideals that are oriented towards the divine
or are characteristic of one’s relation to the divine. Normally these ideals principally affect
one’s private life and one’s (personal) relation with a transcendent being and are therefore
neutral with regard to the public domain. However, this is not necessarily the case, for even
personal ideals can also have a bearing on convictions that shape the way in which people
act in the public domain. For instance, trying to live up to the commandments of the divine
will likely have an influence on the way in which adherents look upon others. To take an
extreme example we could mention the Phelps, an extremist Christian family living in
Westboro, Kansas. Their religion is particularly toxic, for owing to their immovable
convictions they have been known to organize pickets at funerals of soldiers who have
fallen in the Iraq war at which they tell the world that God hates America because the US,
in their view, loves homosexuals.12 Although their hate campaign falls under First
Amendment protections of free speech—and thus is permissible within the bounds of a
liberal democracy13 because they do not physically attack other people or incite others to
do so—their ideals, including the way in which they pursue them, are not neutral to the
ideals of a liberal democracy. Neither, for that matter, are they consistent with the
requirements of reasonable pluralism.
However, the pursuit of religious ideals can be neutral to the public domain while the
ideals themselves are not. Some are devout believers as well as convinced liberal
12 For more information about the Phelps family, we can refer the reader to their website:
http://www.godhatesfags.com/
13 While all liberal democratic constitutions make provisions for criminal action to be taken against def-
amation and the incitement to riot, exactly what constitutes hate speech, and thus what will be publicly
tolerated, will vary from one liberal democratic context to another.
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democrats. While they may personally believe that divorce that is not annulled by the
Roman Catholic Church is immoral or that homosexuality is an abomination, they are also
committed to the liberal democratic ideal that everyone should be able to live their life as
they see fit and therefore oppose any kind of discrimination on the basis of their private
moral convictions. Notice that this pursuit of religious ideals is consistent with the
requirements of reasonable pluralism.
Finally, some religious ideals, including the way in which they are pursued, are
opposed to those of reasonable pluralism. When religious ideals are perceived as blue-
prints and thereby cease to be tolerant, it seems they necessarily collide with reasonable
pluralism, because being reasonable not only assumes that one is able to revise one’s
ideals, but also that others are entitled to espouse beliefs—and in most instances act upon
those beliefs—with which one does not agree. The ideal of a theocracy is clearly in
conflict with the ideals of a liberal democracy, but so are ideals that lead believers to
discriminate against others because of their utter contempt of the other’s political views,
religion or sexual identity.
For example, a political understanding of religious ideals impels some Muslims not
only to prioritize the global Muslim community (umma¯h) but also to view liberal
democratic political institutions with utter contempt. Muslims who assimilate themselves
to Western institutional norms (e.g., military service, jury duty) are believed by some to
be betraying their Islamic faith, particularly if they are called upon to fight or testify
against other Muslims. Taking matters further, residence in non-Islamic lands for a few
has a tactical side, one that is driven by ideals which seek to establish an Islamic state
(see Abbas 2007; Choudhury 2007; Husain 2007). Though only endorsed by a small
minority, some Muslims believe that submission to non-Islamic authorities, with no
consideration for Islamic law (shari’a¯h), makes the pursuit of specific Islamic ideals
impossible. Clearly, these political ideals would not count as reasonable comprehensive
doctrines on any reading of reasonable pluralism not only because such ideals offend
against the principles of toleration or mutual respect; they also directly threaten a number
of social goods that political liberals support, including legitimacy, reciprocal trust,
tolerance, and political stability.
Thus, religious ideals may be compatible, or they may collide, with the ideals of
reasonable pluralism, which indicates that reasonable pluralism is not an intolerant or
anti religious doctrine, but is in fact a middle position. This implies that education
consistent with reasonable pluralism in public schools need not exclude the possibility of
incorporating religious ideals in their curriculum. On the contrary, the discussion in this
section has corroborated our reasons for claiming that religious ideals should be part of
the education of pupils in public schools. First, for those whose religious ideals are
compatible with reasonable pluralism it is important that their ultimate values are rec-
ognized in public schools and accepted as a source of inspiration to foster the ideals of
reasonable pluralism. Secondly, it is beneficial to the flourishing of a liberal democracy
that future citizens learn to make nuanced evaluations about conceptions of the good life
for themselves and other citizens. Teaching children about the positive influence of
religious ideals as well as their dangers is arguably conducive to their development into
reasonable citizens.
Of course, our proposal will not be agreeable to those whose religious ideals are
incompatible with the ideals of reasonable pluralism. This is unavoidable, but we have
already argued that this outcome is not unjust given the educational and societal benefits
that accrue to others, including the children of those who espouse ‘unreasonable’ ideals.
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Reasonable Pluralism and the Inclusion of Religious Ideals in Public Secondary
Schools
In the introduction we argued that entering the broader discussion of religion in the public
school through the door of religious ideals may shed some different light on this discus-
sion. We aim to show in the remainder of this section that a focus on religious ideals both
in a strict and broad sense does indeed make a novel contribution to the debate about
religion in public schools.
In the former sections we have shown that religious ideals can be given a place in the
public domain, but it also became apparent that not every religious ideal or every way of
pursuing religious ideals is compatible with the ideals of reasonable pluralism. In this
section we return to three reasons for including religious ideals in public schools we gave
in the introduction, leaving the fourth practical reason aside, and will investigate their
validity in light of the conclusions of the former sections. First, we will ask whether the
importance of religious ideals for believers is a good enough reason for incorporating
religious ideals in public schools. Second, we will review the (in)compatibility of religious
and liberal ideals in relation to the development of pupils into citizens of a liberal
democracy. Third, we will address the claim that including religious ideals into the cur-
riculum of public schools is conducive to the possibility that pupils will flourish as adults.
Finally, our arguments will lead to the observation that religious ideals can indeed be
included successfully in public secondary schools.
We will not be very practical or concrete in this section, but we can say something in
general about the approach and aim of the inclusion of religious ideal in public schools.
Grimmitt (1994) suggests that religious education can pursue three types of aims: (1)
learning religion, (2) learning about religion, and (3) learning from religion. In the first
instance, religion is being transmitted to pupils; in the second, religion is presented as an
academic subject; in the third, educators present religions in such a way that pupils are
invited to investigate the value of various religions. With regard to the inclusion of reli-
gious ideals in public schools, we suggest that the third option is to be preferred, though
interpreted in both a positive and a negative sense. Positively, pupils ought to explore both
the value that religious ideals have for others, but also whether or not particular religious
ideals have value for themselves. Negatively, pupils ought to examine the dastardly lessons
that can be learned from the pursuit of religious ideals.
Religious Ideals are Important to Religious People
In the former section we saw that reasonable pluralism does not exclude the possibility that
people also refer to their religious ideals in the public domain and base their decisions on
these ideals. This means that there is in principle not an argument for excluding them in the
public domain of public schools either. Therefore, it does not seem unfair for religious
persons to insist that their ideals be taken seriously as well. Even stronger, our analysis
suggests that it is difficult to find good reasons for why in principle religious ideals should
be banned from schools. Most religious parents will receive this conclusion with enthu-
siasm, for religious ideals are of considerable importance for believers; for some, religious
ideals in the strict sense are at the core of their identity. It is therefore not surprising that
many parents wish to pass on their religious ideals, both in the strict and broad sense, to
their children, and want to see their ideals recognized in the public schools their children
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attend. However, it is also true that many fear any education in public schools that may
undermine this faith in their children. They may believe that reasonable pluralism supplies
the conditions that will subvert religious ideals in the broad sense, and consequently,
religious ideals in the strict sense (thus motivating some to withdraw their children from
the public schools altogether in order to have those ideals reinforced in a private religious
school).14 This will be true primarily for the group of fundamentalist or orthodox parents;
for the majority of religious parents, the inclusion of the ideals that have a profound
meaning in their lives will be an important recognition of what they dearly value.
Fundamentalist and orthodox parents may find fault with the way in which religious
ideals are addressed in public schools; they will certainly not warm to the idea that their
ideals may be scrutinized in public schools. Even though education congenial to reasonable
pluralism does not have as its aim to undermine the validity of religious ideals, (though it
may restrict the way in which they are pursued), these groups may nevertheless be con-
cerned that the education their children receive will have a negative effect on their beliefs
(see Macedo 1995). Be that as it may, it is important to stress that religious persons not
only live within their respective communities, they also are called upon to function as
members of society.
Religious Ideals and Citizenship of a Liberal Democracy
We have described three types of relation between religious ideals and those of a liberal
democracy and will now discuss the way in which public schools can address religious
ideals that are complementary to, neutral, or opposite to, the ideal of reasonable pluralism.
The focus in citizenship education will primarily be on religious ideals in the broad sense,
more particularly on the religiously inspired moral, social and political ideals. However,
these ideals are influenced by religious ideals in the strict sense and therefore those ideals
will be part of citizenship education, too. Moreover, we would argue that understanding the
motives of religious people with regard to the kind of person they think they should be is
conducive to what it means to be a reasonable citizen.
Earlier we gave several examples of the positive influence of religious ideals on public
life or society, like being just, caring, humble and temperate and an ideal society in which
everyone is equal (because everyone is equal before God). We stated that these religious
ideals are complementary to liberal democratic ideals. Inviting pupils to learn from reli-
gious ideals that cohere with liberal democratic ideals can have a twofold function: Doing
so (1) fosters understanding and respect of others; and (2) pupils learn that the laws of a
liberal democracy serve to protect reasonable pluralism and that religious ideals may be an
important source of inspiration for some to pursue the ideals of a liberal democracy.
All pupils need to learn that there is a difference to be made between evaluating
religious ideals and the way in which they are pursued. Pupils may be stimulated to discuss
religious ideals and be critical about them, but they also need to learn that they have to
respect the right of others to have ideals they themselves believe to be unjust, wrong or
simplistic. In contrast, the way in which ideals are pursued should be scrutinized and the
pursuit of ideals that infringes the harm principle should be sanctioned. Pupils also need to
learn that what is of ultimate importance to them may not be the same for others, and that
no one’s particular conception of the good life should determine what happens in the
14 This phenomenon is perhaps more common in North America,, but one certainly notices a similar
phenomenon in Europe with the rapid expansion of faith schools, particularly among various minority
groups. For example, concerning the recent growth in Hindu schools, see Merry and Driessen, forthcoming.
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public and political sphere. Pupils who have religious ideals that do not cohere with those
of a liberal democracy, should learn that they are nevertheless entitled to have these, i.e.
that no one may deny them their right of having and pursuing them in the private domain—
unless they are harmful to others. However they should also learn that in the public domain
they should pursue their ideals in such a way that the effect is not negative but at least
neutral in the way we have described it. Although these pupils may feel that this invites a
kind of schizophrenia between their public and private life (McLaughlin 1995), they have
to learn to accept that this is the best way in which people with different and even opposing
views on life can live together harmoniously.
Finally, pupils will learn valuable lessons from religious ideals that are opposed to those
of a liberal democracy, particularly from the ways in which the pursuit of these ideals may
undermine the freedoms of others as protected under a liberal democratic constitution. That
it is necessary for citizens of a liberal democracy to stay within the limits of the law, even
when they believe themselves to be on the higher moral high ground, needs no defense.
The evils that may emanate from the pursuit of certain religious ideals may be precisely the
examples that motivate pupils to cultivate the moral dispositions necessary for strength-
ening deliberative democracy.
Religious Ideals and the Flourishing of Pupils
By learning from religious ideals pupils are invited to reflect on the values they take for
granted, either because they are unthinkingly adopted from their parents or because they
prevail in mainstream society. But why would this be important for their flourishing?
We suggest that persons are only able to flourish if they can give their own subjective
interpretation to the objective goods of human well-being such as health, caring rela-
tionships, autonomy, creativity, and intellectual development. By ‘interpretation’ we mean
that persons must come to identify with a conception of each of these in a way that
personally makes sense and is worth pursuing for its own sake (De Ruyter 2007). In order
to be able to discover which interpretation allows children to flourish as adults, it is
important that they are introduced to different ways of life. There is not a one-to-one
correspondence between what parents do or believe and find meaningful and what will
enable their children to flourish. Public schools can play a significant role in furthering the
possibility that children flourish when they are adults precisely by including values in the
curriculum that are different from those of the families of the pupils and mainstream
society (Brighouse 2005).
Yet the inclusion of alternative ways of life is not sufficient. It is important that children
also learn that there are good and bad interpretations of the objective goods (De Ruyter
2007). For example, being a modest eater is arguably more conducive to one’s flourishing
than the extremes of obesity or anorexia; an honest friend or a loving partner are clearly
much more able to contribute to human flourishing than would someone who is deceitful or
narcissistic. Educators can assist children in providing them with examples of the best or
ideal interpretations of objective goods. This enables children to become good judges of
values themselves. Which interpretation will bring intrinsic satisfaction is something that
children have to discover for themselves, but what makes their actions within this inter-
pretation good is something that educators can teach them. If someone knows what is best,
that person is able to evaluate current as well as future or alternative practices against these
supreme standards. This includes religious ideals as well.
We suggest that public schools offer religious ideals in the broad sense, in order for
pupils to discover if the ideals of these religions regarding, for example, sexuality or
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morality, are good for them, too. This does not mean that they have to adopt the religion
itself; the ideal does not have to become a religious ideal for them, though it may be
transformed into a personal ideal for their own lives. For example, the sexual ideal of
chastity before marriage or fidelity during one’s life-long relationship are meaningful
alternatives to promiscuous alternatives found on music channels like the Box, MTV or
TMF. We also stated that Christian and Islamic religious ideals normally refer to non-
materialistic and non-competitive excellent or perfect values, and therefore, for some
children, could be an antidote to the dominance of materialism and competition in
mainstream society (see Burtt 2003; Conroy 2004; Merry 2007). By learning from reli-
gious ideals, pupils are invited to learn from what, to paraphrase Matthew Arnold’s words,
many consider to the best that has been said and thought in the world.
Conclusion
On the basis of our foregoing reflections, we conclude that it is important for public schools
to incorporate religious ideals into their curricula. Concisely put, this consists of offering
pupils the possibility for positive learning from religious ideals that are compatible with
reasonable pluralism and for learning from the negative effects of ideals when they are
pursued in ways that are detrimental to those valued in liberal democracies.
Finally, it still might be objected that our argument, including our suggestions for the
way in which the religious ideals might be included, is based on liberal democratic
principles and therefore we have been begging the question. This may be partly true, but
we have pushed the discussion of religious toleration and reasonable pluralism much
further along. Importantly, we have shown that a separation between church and state does
not mean that religious ideals have no place in the public domain or that ideals should be
banned from public schools. Particularly today when religion is back in the centre of the
public and political discussion, but where much of the attention is negative and does little
to foster mutual understanding among religious and non-religious persons, or, for that
matter, among persons with different religious commitments, the current silence in public
schools should be replaced with the inclusion of religious ideals. The combination of the
reasons we have offered is, in our view, sufficient to draw this conclusion, and, we hope,
will assist in opening a new line of debate about religion in public schools.
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